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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
RONALD W. HARDY,
APPELLEE'S BRIEF
Petitioner/Appellant,
Court of Appeals No. 20040812

v.
JEAN HARDY [GWIRTZ],
Respondent/Appellee

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-2a3(2)(h)(2004).
This is an appeal from a trial court's denial of Appellant's motion for Appellee to
be found in contempt of court in a parent time dispute. Appellee granted parent time to
Appellant in accordance with the parent time schedule that was in effect at the time that
Appellant's parent time rights were last defined by the Court. Although there was a
subsequent change in the statutory parent time schedule that granted the noncustodial an
extra day and a half of parent time for President's Day in even-numbered years, Appellee
was neither aware of that change nor aware that a subsequent change in statute could or
would affect her case. She neither offered parent time for the additional day and a half
nor denied any request for that additional time. The trial court found that Appellee's

omission did not constitute contempt of court because the omission was not willful
disobedience of a court order.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue No. 1: Are the Court's Conclusions of Law clearly erroneous?
Standard of Review: This Court reviews challenges to a trial court's conclusions
of law under a correction of error standard. Groberg v. Housing Opportunities, Inc., 68
P.3d 1015, 1017 (Utah App. 2003); Bailey v. Call, 161 P.2d 138, 139-140- (Utah App.
1989). This standard mandates that this Court give no deference to the legal conclusions
of the trial court. Roderick v. Ricks, 54 P.3d. 1119 (Utah 2002).
Issue No. 2: Did the Court err in not holding Appellee in contempt for failing to
be aware of the governing visitation statute even where the same denies statutory
visitation to the noncustodial parent?
Standard of Review: This Court reviews challenges to a trial court's conclusions
of law under a correction of error standard. Groberg v. Housing Opportunities, Inc., 68
P.3d 1015, 1017 (Utah App. 2003); Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 138, 139-140- (Utah App.
1989). This standard mandates that this Court give no deference to the legal conclusions
of the trial court. Roderick v. Ricks, 54 P.3d. 1119 (Utah 2002).
Issue No. 3: Should parents in divorce situations subject to visitation have a duty
to know and to obey the latest version of the visitation statute - and should the Court
express a duty in Ibis regard?
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Standard of Review: This Court reviews challenges to a trial court's conclusions
of law under a correction of error standard. Groberg v. Housing Opportunities, Inc., 68
P.3d 1015, 1017 (Utah App. 2003); Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 138,139-140- (Utah App.
1989). This standard mandates that this Court give no deference to the legal conclusions
of the trial court. Roderick v. Ricks, 54 P.3d. 1119 (Utah 2002).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions is applicable to this case:
Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 18

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-1(5)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter, on appeal, directly challenges case law holding that knowledge of the
requirements of a court order must be proven by clear and convincing evidence in a civil
contempt proceeding. That case law may be found at Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d
1162 (Utah 1988); Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass 'n v. Labrum, 762 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1988).
Appellant challenges the trial court's conclusion of law that Appellee could not be
found in contempt of court because her action was not "willful." While admitting that
Appellee did not know that the visitation statute had been expanded to give noncustodial
parents an additional day and a half for President's Day in even-numbered years,
3

Appellant implicitly argues that simple "noncompliance/' without finding the elements of
knowledge or intent is sufficient for a finding of contempt or, in the alternative, the
standard for knowledge should be subjectively applied so that Appellee could be found in
contempt if she should have known even if she did not actually know and even if she had
no intent to disobey a court order. In addition, Appellant appears to argue that the
subjective standard should be retroactively applied to Appellee so that she may be found
in contempt for the visitation for Presidents Day 2002.
ARGUMENT SUMMARY
POINT I
Existing case law, requiring a finding that Appellee "willfully" violated an order
of the court, and the trial court's finding that Appellee relied upon an old version of the
visitation statute and complied with that version, left the trial court no choice but to find
that this party did not commit contempt of court. A finding of "willful" action requires
the Court to find that Appellee knew that a court order required different conduct and
deliberately violated that order. In the case at hand, the parties agreed that Appellee did
not know that a court order required different conduct. Therefore, the Court correctly
applied the law to this case and reached the correct conclusion.

POINT II
The Court could not have found Appellee in contempt of court for failing to be
aware of a change in law because the Court had not ordered her to be aware of changes in
4

the law. At Utah Code Ann. 78-32-1, the law very clearly sets forth twelve (12) acts and
omissions that constitute contempt. Failing to know about changes in the law is nowhere
in the list of such acts and omissions. Even Appellant admits that no Utah statute or case
law or rule of law imposes such a duty upon custodial parents. Therefore, the Court
correctly held that Appellee did not willfully violate a court order.

POINT III
Appellant argues for new law, law not currently existing or supported by any
statute or appellate court, imposing upon Appellee a duty that has not previously existed
and finding her in contempt of court for breaching that duty. This Court should resist
this pressure, as any such duty could not be imposed upon Appellee without violating the
constitutional prohibition on ex post facto law.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT'S CONCLUSION OF LAW WAS NOT
ERRONEOUS

The trial court correctly found that Appellee could not be found in contempt of
court if she did not knowingly, willfully violate an order of the court. In order to prove
contempt for failure to comply with a court order it must be shown that the party cited for
contempt knew what was required, had the ability to comply, and willfully and
knowingly refused to comply". Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass 'n v. Labrum, 762 P.2d
5

1070, (Utah 1988); see also. Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988). These
elements must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Von Hake, Mil.
Appellant implicitly attacks two of the two of the three elements of contempt - the
element of knowledge and the element of intent. The element of knowledge, a
requirement that the person cited for contempt knew what was required, is particularly
important in this case because Appellee lacked two different types of "knowledge."
First, Appellee did not know that subsequent changes in the law changed her rights
and obligations under the existing visitation order. Nothing in any court order informed
her that such changes could happen without returning to court, no law states that changes
in the visitation statute apply to existing court orders, and no case law addresses the issue
of whether or not a statutory change requires a petition for modification or if the statute
invisibly and quietly modifies substantive provisions of existing orders without the
knowledge of either party. This question has been debated in multiple courts in the
context of petitions for modification and would be an interesting question on a law school
exam. Interesting and persuasive arguments can be made for both sides of the debate.
Appellee should not be faulted for not knowing the answer.
Second, Appellee did not know that the visitation statute had been changed to
grant noncustodial parents an additional day and a half of visitation for President's Day in
even-numbered years. Utah Code Ann. 30-3-35 (2004). Appellant does not deny that he
did not know either and evidence presented at hearing indicates that Appellant did not
inform Appellee or request the additional time with his daughter. Instead, Appellant
6

cites reasons why he believes that Appellee should have known, but does not deny that
she did not know. For a finding of contempt, however, the burden is upon Appellant to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that Appellee actually knew. Appellant failed to
carry that burden and the Court had no choice but to find that there was no contempt of
court.
Appellant explicitly attacks the requirement for a finding as to the element of
intent. Contempt of court is quasi-criminal in nature and can include civil damages,
fines and even incarceration. Utah Code Ann. 78-32-10; Utah Code Ann. 78-32-11;
Utah Code Ann. 78-32-12. Because of the extremely serious nature of the allegation and
the penalties, it is only appropriate that it requires a finding that the accused "willfully
and knowingly refused to comply." Utah Farm Prod, Credit Ass fn v. Labrum, 762 P.2d
1070 (Utah 1988). In attacking the requirement as to intent, it is unclear if Appellant
seeks to impose upon custodial parents strict liability for visitation issues or if he wishes
to create a new, quasi-crime of "negligent contempt" wherein custodial parents may be
punished without intent for not knowing the law. Either way, Appellant should be
denied. Strict liability and crimes of neglect should be reserved for circumstances with
much, much greater potential for devastating and irreparable harm that the simple failure
to get an additional day and a half of visitation that the noncustodial parent didn't even
request.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO
HOLD APPELLEE IN CONTEMPT FOR BEING
UNAWARE OF THE CURRENT VISITATION
STATUTE.
As set forth above, Appellee could not have been found in contempt of court for
not being aware of the change in the visitation statute because nothing in the law requires
her to track changes in the law. She not only didn't know that the statute had been
changed to give him an extra day and a half, but she had no reason to believe that the
order of the court granting him visitation in accordance with Utah Code Ann. 30-3-35
meant "as that statute is today and as it may be changed at any time in the future" instead
of just "as that statute is right now."
Even if the Court had, for whatever reason, found that Appellee had a duty to track
changes in the visitation statute, and had violated that duty by not knowing about the
President's Day holiday, the Court still could not have found Appellee in contempt of
court without finding both that she knew she had that duty and had willfully failed to
remain current in the law. Therefore, the Court's decision not to hold Appellee in
contempt of court was not an error but was entirely supported by the law.
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POINT III
SHOULD THE COURT CREATE A DUTY FOR
PARENTS IN DIVORCE SITUATIONS WITH
CHILDREN SUBJECT TO VISITATION TO KNOW
AND TO OBEY THE LATEST VERSION OF THE
VISITATION STATUTE?
The answer to Appellant's question lies in the answers to two smaller questions (1) Do statutory changes in the visitation statute automatically amend divorce decrees and
visitation orders without the need for a Petition to Modify or a "substantial change in
circumstance"? and (2) Which parent bears the burden of this duty and what if both
parents fail in this duty as in the case at hand?
Appellee respectfully submits that, while the answer to the first question would
satisfy counsel's curiosity, it is not a question relevant to the trial court's decision in this
particular case unless the Court imposes this duty retroactively, finds Appellee in
contempt of court for violating a duty that had not yet been created, and violates
Appellee's constitutional right to protection from ex post facto laws. Utah Const. Art. I,
Sec. 18. Appellant is asking "What should the law be" and not "Did the trial court
correctly apply the law." Such a question is entertaining but unhelpful in determining if
Appellee violated the visitation order.
The second question - which parent should bear the burden of remaining current
in the law - would also satisfy curiosity but has no practical bearing upon the issues of
this case. As this duty was not assigned to either Appellee or Appellant, neither
9

breached the duty even though neither parent knew that the visitation statute had
changed. In this case, Appellee did not "make the child available" for visitation as
required by Utah Code Ann. 30-3-33(5), but Appellant did not fulfill his duty to pick up
the child for visitation. The Court could not punish either party for his or her failures or
omissions because neither violated a court order. Appellee cannot be punished for breach
of a duty created and assigned after the fact.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appelle respectfully requests that this court uphold the
decision of the trial court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/?

day of ^Of2^

2005.

SMART, SCHOFIELD, SHORTER & LUNCEFORD
A Professional Corporation

JenniferPrl^ee
Attorney for Appellee

10

v

^—-

—

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

/ 7

day of -^Y~)sx*s\

, 2005, I served a

copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE on each of the following by depositing a copy
in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to:
Blaine T. Hofeling
Hofeling & Wayment, LLP
51 East 400 North, Bldg.l
Cedar City, Utah 84720

11

